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"Whistleblowing" is the act or process of alerting others to scandal, danger,
malpractice, corruption or other wrongdoing. In this article, the authors assert that
a strongly developed freedom of conscience, distinct from freedom of religion.
could contribute to the development of socially-valuable whistleblowing. While
conscience is often treated as inseparable from religion, the authors suggest
that the deliberate inclusion of "conscience" in s. 2(a) of the Charter implies that
"conscience" ought to be recognized as an independent and robust freedom.
This then provides the framework for accepting and recognizing the importance of
whistleblowing and lessening its social stigma. The article presents this argument
in three parts: providing an overview of whistleblowing and its development within
a modern legal and business environment, then exploring the nature of freedom
of conscience and finally, modeling how this freedom could prove useful for
interpreting whistleblowing in Canada.
La ddnonciation est I'action de signaler 6 d'autres un scandale, un danger, une
faute professionnelle, de la corruption ou tout autre acte rdprdhensible. Dans cet
article, les auteurs affirment qu'une libert6 de conscience fortement developp6e,
distincte de la libert6 de religion, pourrait contribuer 4 ce qu'une valeur sociale
soit associde 6 la d6nonciation. M~me si la conscience est souvent consid6r6e
comme 6tant indissociable de la religion, les auteurs avancent que l'inclusion
delibrde du mot < conscience - dans le paragraphe 2(a) de la Charte sousentend que la < conscience - doit 6tre reconnue comme une libert6 forte et
inddpendante. Les bases sont ainsi jet6es pour que soit acceptde et reconnue
l'importance de la d6nonciation et pour que soit att6nud le stigmate social qui
l'entoure. Larticle prdsente cet argument en trois temps : il donne un apergu de
la d6nonciation et de la place qu'elle a prise graduellement dans I'environnement
14gal et dans le monde des affaires modernes, it examine la nature de Ia libertd
de conscience et, enfin, if propose des fagons dont cette libertd pourrait 6tre utile
pour interprdter la d~nonciation au Canada.
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In matters of conscience the law of majority has no place.
- Mahatma Gandhi
Introduction
Most of us have an instinctive understanding of what "whistleblowing" is:
the act of alerting the public to scandal, danger, malpractice, corruption,
or other immoral or unethical behaviour. A whistleblower usually feels
compelled to act where public interests in health, safety, and security are
in imminent peril. For a long time, whistleblowers were not recognized in
a favourable light, often characterized as disloyal, traitors, or tattletales
who, rather than being commended for acting constructively, were often
belittled, treated as pariahs, forced to recant, or even leave their jobs.
Times have changed, and whistleblowers are now acknowledged and
sometimes even admired. There is still some way to go, however, to reach
complete acceptance. We believe that a strongly developed freedom of
conscience, as expressed in s 2(a) of the CanadianCharterof Rights and
Freedoms,' but distinct from freedom of religion, could go some way
towards achieving that goal.
Beginning with the Reformation, conscience and religion have been
strongly linked in Western thought, such that distinctions between them
are often minimized. Martin Luther connected the two by claiming that an
individual's belief or unbelief is a matter of conscience and that Catholics
held only a "conscience in appearance" since their conscience was not

1.

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11

ICharter].
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guided by scripture. 2 A few centuries later, John Stuart Mill, a philosopher
normally given to careful parsing of concepts, nevertheless also appears
to treat the two terms synonymously (or, at least, is indifferent to any
distinction) when he asserts that the great writers of the past, espousing
liberty, have relied on "freedom of conscience" to ensure that no one is
accountable to another for a religious belief.3
Conscience is often treated as inseparable from religion, in other
words, without any meaningful analysis of the relationship between the
two. This is especially true in legal constitutional terms, where the elision
usually comes at the expense of "conscience." At best then, conscience
takes the form of a silent partner to religion. At worst, it is frequently
ignored or unnoticed.
This need not be so. In this paper, we argue that the deliberate inclusion
of "conscience" in s 2(a) of the Charter ought to be taken seriously; to
do so, freedom of conscience must be recognized as an independent and
robust freedom. A fully developed freedom of conscience might bring
a less divisive, morality-based freedom into the foreground, subsuming
some forms of religious freedom within it.
Whistleblowing is an activity that seems to have some connection to
conscience, but not necessarily to religion. If conscience is recognized
as an independent freedom, separate from religion, its legal development
may be best informed by an analysis of whistleblowing, and vice versa.
In this article, we canvass how whistleblowing might be treated as a
special form of activity that lends substance to an independent freedom
of conscience under the Charter. Without developing a fully-fledged
argument that freedom of conscience should be the default freedom,
encompassing religious freedom in many cases, we argue that an approach
to freedom of conscience could be used for a more commonplace purpose,
such as a framework for accepting and recognizing the importance of
whistleblowing and lessening its stigma within society.
The paper sketches this idea out in three parts: first, briefly, we
discuss whistleblowing and its development within a modern legal and
business environment. We then explore the nature of a stand-alone legal
and constitutional freedom of conscience, sketching out an argument for
its singularity and importance. In the last part, we show how a revitalized
freedom of conscience-distinct and separate from religious freedomcould provide a model for interpreting whistleblowing in Canada.
See Joseph Lecler, Toleration and the Reformation, vol 1 (New York: Association Press, 1960)
2.
quoting Luther's letter of Nov 1525 or Feb 1526, 157-158.
3.
On Liberty (Toronto: Penguin, 1982) at 66-67.
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I. Whistleblowing: history and development
Whistleblowing is an emerging sui generis field of law,4 which integrates
disparate elements of the law of privacy, labour and employment, civil
procedure,' contracts,6 ethics, defamation, the constitutional rights of
expression and conscience,' professional responsibility and administrative
law, crimes, confidential information and privilege, business organizations
and corporate governance, codes of conduct, dispute resolution, and various
regulatory instruments.' Most of these legal elements are adapted to fit
and serve de facto whistleblowing scenarios, such as whether a specific
employee disclosure of employer wrongdoing to the media amounts to
sufficient cause for summary dismissal.
On the other hand, some forms of legal ordering aim to encourage
or protect whistleblowing more generally: criminal and regulatory
legislation, for example, is purpose-built for whistleblowing activity.
These types of legislation come in two forms. The first form we call
"embedded" whistleblowing legislation, where a collection of protective

The first known law school course in Canada focused entirely on the subject of whistleblowing
4.
was taught by Peter Bowal at the Faculty of Law, Western University in January 2005.
The retaliatory civil lawsuit in defamation is a predictable response taken by the individual
5.
who is reported to have acted wrongly, to intimidate and punish whistleblowers. See, Peter Bowal,
"The Whistleblower's Qualified Privilege Defence to Defamation" (Paper delivered at the Academy
of Legal Studies in Business, 79th Annual Conference, Ottawa, ON, 18-21 August 2004); and Terry
Dworkin et al, "Whistleblowing and Defamation in the US, Great Britain and Canada" (Paper delivered
at the Annual Conference of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business, San Francisco, CA, 2-6 August
2005).
In the United States, SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) rules and procedures
may deter this retaliatory litigation. Canadian jurisdictions do not have SLAPP provisions. The
Quebec government introduced a new law in 2009 to curb abusive civil proceedings and the Uniform
Law Conference of Canada is proposing a similar model act that could be applied in every province:
Kevin Marron, "SLAPP on the Wrist", CanadianLawyer (4 January 2010), online: Canadian Lawyer
<http://www.canadianlawyer.com/SLAPPs-on-the-wrist.html>.
Defendants, even those with valid defences, do not often find support in summary dismissal
procedures. Recently Ontario's summary judgment rule was significantly changed to encourage more
litigants, such as whistleblower defendants, to dispose of actions before trial. In the recent case of
Optech Inc v Sharma, 2011 ONSC 680, Justice David Brown set out a comprehensive critique of the
court's new powers under the revised rule, positing that the costs and complexities of litigation may
now actually increase.
One common issue is the enforceability of confidentiality clauses in the light of competing
6.
public policy interests.
7.
Supra note 1, ss 2(b) and 2(a), respectively.
8.
The history, theory, and law of whistleblowing in Canada is not highly organized in academic
writing to date. Much of what has been published may be found on blogs, websites, and disparate
incident reports. Many of the principles and issues, although not the laws themselves, are universal.
To this end, see Stephen M Kohn, Concepts and Procedures in Whistleblower Law (Westport, CT:
Quorum Books, 2001). The leading international not-for-profit organization with a focus on state
anti-corruption initiatives and international business is Transparency International, at <http://www.
transparency.org>.
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provisions is contained within an existing regulatory regime. I There are
many examples of embedded whistleblower protections in federal and
provincial legislation across Canada, such as protection for employees who
file complaints against their employers under human rights, occupational
health and safety, or environmental legislation. The second form we refer to
as "encompassing" whistleblowing legislation. Encompassing legislation
sets up a system or model to address and regulate whistleblowing in a larger,
yet identifiable, sector of activity. Examples of this form of independent,
comprehensive whistleblowing legislation are the federal Public Servants
DisclosureProtectionAct"o and the Manitoba Public Interest Disclosure
(Whistleblower Protection)Act." While less prevalent than the embedded
form of legislation, encompassing legislation is more frequently enacted
in response to a highly-publicized, and often politicized, scandal in the
public sector. The goal is usually to detect and ultimately prevent such
scandals in the future.12
The recent growth in whistleblowing legislation has its roots in Enron
and similar corporate accounting frauds that occurred in the United States
beginning in late 2001. This culminated in the omnibus Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOX) legislative package" to strengthen corporate governance, controls,
and responsibility over financial reporting of US-listed companies.
Provincial securities regulators in Canada largely copied and imported
these provisions to apply to the Canadian securities markets. 4 Public
sector whistleblowing legislation received its greatest impetus in early
2006 with the introduction of Bill C-2, the FederalAccountability Act,"
by a new minority government that had just fought and won an election
on the promise to "stand up for Canada" in the wake of the well known

9.
These auxiliary provisions do not "give employees the message that they are to be generalized
watchdogs against organizational wrongdoing": Marcia P Miceli & Janet P Near, Blowing the Whistle:
The Organizational and Legal Implicationsfor Companies and Employees (New York: Lexington
Books, 1992) at 234.
10. SC, 2005, c 46.
11. CCSM, c P217. See also protective provisions for all employees in employment legislation, such
as Employment StandardsAct, SNB 1982, c E-7.2, s 28(c) and the Labour StandardsAct, RSS 1978,
c L-1, s 74(1) (as amended); and in regulations applying to the public service only, such as the Civil
Service Disclosureof Wrongdoing Regulations, NS Reg 205/2004, enacted pursuant to Section 45 of
the Civil Service Act, RSNS 1989, c 70.
12. At the time of writing, a former government member of the Alberta legislature was alleging
double book-keeping and that health care professionals in Alberta were paid "in the millions" to
remain silent about cancer patients dying on the wait lists. He refused to identify his sources until
new whistleblower legislation granting him "complete immunity" was enacted: see, "Maverick MLA
Alleges Cancer Death Cover-up," Calgary Herald (01 March 2011) A4.
13. Infra, note 58.
14. See, infra, text accompanying footnote 61.
15. SC 2006, c 9.
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"sponsorship scandal" and Gomery Commission Report.16 And yet,
Canadian whistleblower protection legislation has both its proponents"
and detractors.'" Part of the problem has to do with understanding what is
meant by whistleblowing. We turn now to definitions and other features
of whistleblowing.
1. What is whistleblowing?
As noted above, "whistleblowing" describes a phenomenon that most
people generally recognize. It is, however, difficult to capture in legal
terms. For one, it is sufficiently lacking in formality to carry the load of
a discrete subject of law. Accordingly, whistleblowing legislation often
invokes other terminology such as making "disclosures" or "reports"
in the context of the "public interest" and "integrity." 9 These terms are
chosen to portray the activity in a more positive light.20
There is also little consensus as to the range of whistleblowing
activity that merits legal protection. A narrow view limits whistleblowing
to instances where public interests in health, safety, and security are in
imminent peril. This early form is well represented in Ralph Nader's 1979
definition as "an act of a man or woman who, believing that the public
interest overrides the interest of the organization he serves, blows the

16. Kenneth Kemaghan, Encouraging 'Rightdoing' and Discouraging Wrongdoing: A Public
Service Charter and Disclosure Legislation in Gomery Commission Report, vol 2 (1 February
2006), online: Canada <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/Gomeryll/ResearchStudies2/

CISPAA_vol2_3.pdf> at 73.
17. See, for example, Kenneth Kemaghan & John W Langford, The Responsible Public Servant
(Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990); Keith Archer, "From Rhetoric to Reality:Protecting Whistleblowers in Alberta" (2005), online: Parkland Institute <http://www.ualberta.
ca/parkland>); Jonathan Carson, "The Need for Whistleblowing Legislation in Canada: A Critical
Defence" (2006), online: CPSA <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Carson.pdf>; Kelly
L Saunders & Joanne Thibault, "Whistleblowing in Canada: A New Framework of Analysis"
(2008), online: CPSA <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Saunders.pdf>; and FAIR (Federal
Accountability Initiative for Reform), whose mission statement reads: "promotes integrity and
accountability within government by empowering employees to speak out without fear of reprisal
when they encounter wrongdoing. Our aim is to support legislation and management practices
that will provide effective protection for whistleblowers and hence occupational free speech in the
workplace." Transparency International, which describes itself as "the global coalition against
corruption" published "Recommended Principles for Whistleblowing Legislation (November 2009),"
online: TI <http://www.transparency.org/>.
18. E.g., Brian Martin, "Illusions of Whistleblower Protection" (2003) 5 UTS L Rev 119.
19. The language of "rightdoing" has also emerged, particularly in the Public Service of Canada.
See, e.g., Kenneth Kernaghan, supranote 16 at 73.
20. Some of the pejorative descriptors of the whistleblower include tattle-tale, traitor, nark,
snitch, muckraker, unstable, turncoat, squealer, rat, informer, whiner, stool pigeon, and spy. Other
whistleblower-related conceptions are "shooting the messenger" and "bearer of bad news."
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whistle that the organization is involved in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or
harmful activity." 2 1
Amore liberal approach, which we favour, integrates more completely
with conscience. This broader approach defines whistleblowing as the
reporting of any wrongdoing to anyone inside or outside one's organization
where any form of retaliation may be expected. It is the spectre and essence
of retaliation in any form or degree that most saliently tests the limits of
acting upon one's conscience.
While whistleblowing is about disclosure, the desire to inform
must also serve a socially useful function. Unwanted disclosure bears
the elemental quality of an indictment in that it identifies a wrongdoing
and accuses and challenges a person or an organization. The indicting
disclosures are usually made because the whistleblower feels possessed
of insufficient authority over the wrongdoer and power to effect change
by other means. 22 Jubb's widely-accepted definition includes this element:
Whistleblowing is a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which
gets onto public record and is made by a person who has or had privileged
access to data or information of an organization, about non-trivial
illegality or other wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated
which implicates and is under the control of that organization, to an
external entity having potential to rectify the wrongdoing.23
Thus, reportable wrongdoing in whistleblowing legislation and corporate
policies usually embraces one of the following, in declining order of
seriousness: contravention of a law; an act or omission that creates
a substantial danger to the life, health, or safety of persons or the
environment; gross financial or other mismanagement (especially in
public sector organizations); abuse of power such as conflicts of interest
and harassment; serious breaches of an organizational code of conduct or
other policy; an act of reprisal; 24 and unethical behaviour. 25
21. Nader, Petkas & Blackwell, Whistleblowing: The Report of the Conference on Professional
Responsibility (New York: Grossman, 1972), quoted in Nicholas M Rongine, "Toward a Coherent
Legal Response to the Public Policy Dilemma Posed by Whistleblowing" (1985) 23:2 Am Bus L J 28.
22. Wim Vandekerckhove, Whistleblowing and OrganizationalSocial Responsibility: A Global
Assessment (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006) at 22.
23. Peter B Jubb, "Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation" (1999) 21:1 J Bus
Ethics 77 at 78.
24. In practice, whistleblowing often involves two wrongs: the original substantive wrong and the
cover-up or reprisal.
25. The whistleblowing clich6 "speaking truth to power" dates to the publication of the pamphlet
Speak Truth to Power by American Quakers in 1955, proposing a new approach to the Cold War.
Since then the term has been frequently used in many different contexts. For example, Speaking Truth
to Power (New York: Doubleday, 1997) was the title of Anita Hill's book alleging sexual harassment
by US Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas.
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In fact, it may be easier to define whistleblowing by its negative. As
whistleblowing is anchored in verifiable wrongdoing, neither criticism
nor outspoken dissent from the employer's policies is whistleblowing,
although these may be protected forms of speech under the Charter26
or at common law.2 7 Likewise, generally poor management decisions or
styles and even persistent managerial incompetence would not qualify as
reportable "wrongdoing" under traditional legislative and corporate policy
frameworks regulating whistleblowing.
In practice, legislators and drafters of corporate whistleblowing
policies define the boundaries of reportable wrongdoing and the prescribed
channels of reporting. These parameters control both whistleblowing and
the scope of anti-retaliation protection.
2. The venues and values of whistleblowing
If we conceive of whistleblowing as, in general, the reporting of
wrongdoing, the contexts in which it may arise become equally expansive.
The three principal venues in which whistleblowing may occur are the
workplace, the competitive marketplace, and at-large or qua citizen. All
can interact directly with a person's conscience.
The workplace, the most fertile source ofwhistleblowing reports, is the
focus of most anti-retaliation legislation and corporate internal disclosure
policies.2 8 The distinguishing features of workplace whistleblowing
relate to the relational power differential and highly captive nature of
the whistleblower. The full range of retaliation, inside and outside the
workplace, may be applied against the whistleblowing employee in
organizations that demand obedience, conformity, and loyalty. At work, the
whistleblower may not be viewed as trustworthy or a reliable team player
and, in response, may be granted reduced access to information, facilities,
consultation, and decision-making. As a result of whistleblowing, one may
receive critical performance appraisals, be denied raises and promotions, or
passed over for discretionary bonuses, perquisites, and for interesting work
and future opportunities for further growth and development. Socially, the
whistleblower may be ostracized at work, shunned, and excluded. Many
whistleblowers are disciplined at their place of employment, to the point
of being demoted or terminated, even where they followed whistleblowing
26. Alberta Union of ProvincialEmployees vAlberta, 2002 ABCA 202; 312 AR 9; 218 DLR (4th)
16; [2002] 1l WWR 1; 5 Alta LR (4th) 238.
27. Fraserv PSSRB, [1985] 2 SCR 455, 23 DLR (4th) 122, 9 CCEL 233, 19 CRR 152; 18 Admin
LR 72.
28. For analysis of a public sector whistleblowing program, see Peter Bowal, "[Municipal]
Whistleblowing Program is Working," Calgary Herald (07 March 2009) online: <http://www.
calgaryherald.com/Whistle+blowing+working/1364639/story.html>.
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policies in effect and where their report of wrongdoing was accurate. They
may be sued for defamation by the employer or by individuals whose
conduct they have reported.2 9
Where a business reports on its competitor's law-breaking to an
external regulator or to the media, it is engaging in competitive marketplace
whistleblowing. This can also occur in more arm's length cases involving
fiduciaries, agents, or equivalents: for example, financial analysts, whose
business it is to report to its clients the veracity of corporate financial
positions in which those clients may be interested in investing, or third party
researchers, such as university academics and investigative journalists,
who investigate and report on events. Less personally captive, these
whistleblowers are nevertheless more vulnerable to threats, withdrawal of
resources and other support, campaigns to discredit the whistleblower, and
retaliatory litigation.
Qua citizen whistleblowing occurs where civic-minded individuals,
in their personal capacity, step forward and report wrongdoing in the form
of crimes and other regulatory transgressions. These individuals may be
motivated by social conscience, morality, self-preservation, or financial
reward.30 Perhaps surprising to some, civilian personal investment in
the public law enforcement system is significant. Most criminal and
regulatory offences are voluntarily reported by informants and tipster
witnesses. Given the practical and resource limitations on police and
regulatory enforcement officials to detect infractions, civilians serve as
the durable first reporting system where reports are filed, investigations
are launched, prosecutions are conducted, and laws are enforced.
Such civic involvement creates some risk for the reporter, although
many legal protections exist. The criminal informant, for example, may
be a compelled witness in court proceedings" and may face serious
criminal contempt of court consequences for refusing to give evidence.3 2
On the other hand, the Criminal Code contains numerous provisions
to protect informants and witnesses from retaliation at the hands of the
accused criminal wrongdoer: Informations to Obtain Search Warrants,
which often contain informant particulars, may be sealed by the court33 ;

29. Alford found whistleblowers so isolated that few admitted they would do it again: C Fred Alford,
Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2002).
30. The main source of compensation for criminal reporting is the non-profit organization
Crimestoppers, discussed below.
31. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 698 to 700 [Criminal Code].
32. Ibid, s 708.
33. Ibid, s 487.2.
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accused persons may be ordered to initiate no contact whatsoever with
the informant3 4 ; publication of witness identities may be barred"; the
public may be excluded where warranted36 ; witnesses may testify behind
a screen or outside of the courtroom"; and cross examination may be
limited.39 It is a crime in Canada to obstruct justice by interfering with
witnesses 40 and to impede the administration of justice. 4 1 Ultimately in
the most extreme instances of retaliation risk, informants of crimes are
entitled to protection pursuant to the Witness Protection Program Act, 42
administered by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.4 3
Regardless of its venue, it is our view that the broad approach to
whistleblowing provides both public and private benefits.44 At one level,
whistleblowing gives voice to constitutional freedoms such as conscience
and individual expression. Moreover, it is an ethical endeavour and it may
enhance employee retention in organizations.
Following the "a complaint is a gift" 45 approach, whistleblowing
can serve as an inexpensive, abiding form of enforcement of law, rules,
and ethics in organizations or in society at large. Whistleblowing laws
and policies acknowledge that wrongdoing, particularly by persons in
authority, is an inevitable reality. These laws and policies offer a risk
control and governance system for early detection, identification, and
management of compliance problems. 4 6 If laws and policies are being
violated, it is important for organizations and stakeholders to be the first to
know that, in order for corrective action to be taken. Ultimately, regardless
of the venue, we all benefit from this enhanced level of law enforcement,
accountability, and justice.

34. Ibid, s 515.
35. Ibid, s 486.5.
36. Ibid, s 486.
37. Ibid, s 486.2(2).
38. Ibid, s 486.2 (1).
39. Ibid, ss 486.3 and 486.4.
40. Ibid, s 139.
41. Ibid, s 423.1
42. SC 1996, c 15.
43. Ibid, ss 4 and 5. See also, Gregory Lacko, "The Protection of Witnesses" (November 2004),
online: Department of Justice Canada <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/icg-gci/pw-pt/page4.html>.
44. See, generally, Wim Vandekerckhove, supra note 22.
45. Phrase borrowed from the book bearing that name by Janelle Barlow & Chris Moller, 2d ed (San
Francisco, CA: Berrett Koehler, 2008).
46. Whistleblowing policy makers and administrators acknowledge many issues and concerns with
whistleblowing regimes. These include impact upon morale; how to handle the chronic, obnoxious,
bad faith, or frivolous whistleblower; designation of whom is to receive the reports; effective
investigations; etc.
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3. Encouragingwhistleblowing
Given that whistleblowing has inherent private and social utility, why is
it so fraught with complications and resistance? Why do most workers
who observe wrongdoing not report it?47 The standard response is fear
of retaliation of some kind. Legislation relating to whistleblowing, to
the extent it exists, is-by nature-law that prohibits retaliation against
whistleblowers in stipulated conditions.
In the workplace alone, retaliation can come in essentially unlimited
forms and degrees. Social shunning and ostracism, unfavourable discretion
in earned performance appraisals, salary increases, promotions, desirable
work and opportunities, bonuses, and perquisites are common forms of
retaliation. More subtly, employees may be marginalized by restriction of
information, consultation, and decision-making ability. The greater the
discretion held by the employer to reward and punish employees, the greater
is the opportunity for workplace retaliation. In sum, employers (and it
should not be overlooked, co-workers) can, intentionally or unconsciously,
make life at work difficult for the whistleblower. 48 Whistleblowers may be
explicitly disciplined for expressing their concerns, even where corporate
policy obliges one to do so and the whistleblower acts under a sense of
legal obligation. Yet, retaliation may be much more subtle and difficult to
detect. 49 Thus, there is often a need to create whistleblowing incentives.
Three models exist: mandate, tolerate, and compensate.so
Mandate
Workplaces may adopt a whistleblowing policy as part of a. corporate
governance or integrity program binding upon employees. Canadian
legislation may require private actors to self-report violations of

47. Marcia P Miceli & Janet P Near, "When do Observers of Organizational Wrongdoing Step
Up? Recent US Research on the Factors Associated with Whistleblowing" in David B Lewis, ed, A
Global Approach to Public Interest Disclosure: What Can We Learn From Existing Whistleblowing
Legislation and Research? (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) at 79-80.
48. Peter Bowal, "Whistleblowers: All Truth is Good, But Not all Truth is Good to Say" (2003) 27:6
LawNow 32.
49. See, Wojciech W Gasparski, "Whistleblowing in the Light of the Praxiological Theory of
Struggle" in Marek Arszulowicz & Wojciech W Gasparski, eds, Whistleblowing: In Defence ofProper
Action (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2011) at 9; and Kohn, supra note 8 at 241-247.
50. Peter Bowal, "Three Models of Whistleblowing Regulation" (Paper delivered at the 85th
Annual Conference of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business, Richmond, VA, 3-7 August 2010),
[unpublished]. A fourth model, namely "litigate," applies informally where no specific legal coverage
for whistleblowing can be found.
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regulations." Whistleblowing may be mandated activity pursuant
to professional codes of conduct.52 Teachers, child welfare workers,
physicians, and other professionals are bound by reporting mandates
in the law because of the public interest positions they hold and the
opportunity to observe harm and prevent further harm. As such, they
are compelled to report wrongdoing on the part of both third parties and
professional colleagues.s" These forms of compelled speech can give rise
to constitutional free expression concerns.54
Many corporate whistleblowing policies and codes of conduct state
that employees have a duty not only to follow the procedure prescribed by
the policy in making a report,"s but they are under a legal duty, ostensibly
sanctionable by discipline, to make the report of wrongdoing itself."
Some employees who blow the whistle in accordance with these internal
management policies may nevertheless face retaliation for doing so
because the internal disclosure policy is viewed by management more as
a public value and less as an intended practice." The policies themselves
are usually written in mandatory language ("one must report...") but they
are not, in fact, mandatory. In reality, publication of such policies becomes
51. Mandatory self-reporting of "incidents" may not involve wrongdoing. It provides an early
warning system for government regulators to investigate. Environmental legislation typically imposes
this type of mandatory self-reporting for discharges of toxic substances. See, for example, Canadian
EnvironmentalProtectionAct, SC 1999, c 33, s 95.
The most recent federal example is the Canada Consumer Product Safety Act, SC 2010, c 21.
Effective 20 June 2011, businesses must report to Health Canada all health and safety incidents caused
by their consumer products. Section 14(2) reads: "A person who manufactures, imports or sells a
consumer product for commercial purposes shall provide the Minister and, if applicable, the person
from whom they received the consumer product with all the information in their control regarding
any incident related to the product within two days after the day on which they become aware of the
incident."
52. The Law Society of Upper Canada's Rules of Professional Conduct are typical: rule 6.01 on
"Responsibility to the Profession Generally," subs (3) to (8) contain duties of lawyer members to
report misconduct, certain offences, and to encourage clients to report dishonest conduct, online:
LSUC <http://www.1suc.on.calwith.aspx?id=67 I>.
53. Peter Bowal & Ben Lau, "Professional Ethics" (2005) 29:4 LawNow 18.
54. Peter Bowal, "Reconciling Free Speech and Mandated Reporting of Wrongdoing by
Professionals" (Paper delivered at 85th Annual Conference of the Academy of Legal Studies in
Business, Richmond, VA, 3-7 August 2010), [unpublished].
55. It has been shown that employees who blow the whistle externally to regulators or the media may
suffer harsher discipline than those who report internally in conformity to organizational whistleblowing
policies. See, Peter Bowal, Thomas D Brierton & Carlee Campbell, "The Whistleblower Defence to
Employment Dismissal" (2007) 32:2 LawNow 35.
56. We have found that "duty to report" clauses in professional codes and corporate workplace
policies are usually unaccompanied by sanctions for failure to comply with this duty to report. We
have not been able to locate a single reported enforcement proceeding in the administrative regulation
of professions against a professional who was aware of and failed to report a colleague's breach of the
code.
57. A defence along the lines of "I was just doing my job" maybe successful against termination, but
ineffective against other more subtle forms of retaliation.
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the "public" aspect, but very little is done beyond that-enforcement of
the policies and investigations of reports often do not occur.
These mandatory obligations on individual whistleblowers to
report wrongdoing must not be confused with the legal mandate upon
organizations to implement a whistleblowing management system. In
fact, while the former are becoming more common, only one instance of
the latter mandate exists in Canada. Pursuant to the effect of the SOX"
exportation of American whistleblowing principles, the audit committee of
the board of directors of all Canadian corporations registered on a United
States stock exchange must establish an internal reporting system with
"procedures for the receipt, retention, and treatment ofcomplaints regarding
accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters and for the
anonymous submission by employees of concerns on such matters."" This
internal, up-the-ladder reporting system,60 must be published across the
organization. Most provinces have informally agreed 61on duplicating this
requirement to protect investors in companies listed on Canadian stock
exchanges, enforced by participating provincial securities commissions,
in what has become known as C-SOX. 62
Tolerate
A model of toleration, by far the largest and widest-ranging form of
control over whistleblowing, is found primarily in the regulatory domain.
The idea behind this form of legislation is that individuals who volunteer
reporting of regulatory offences, refuse employer orders to break the law,
co-operate with investigations and give employer-adverse testimony in
court should be protected. Thus, numerous regulatory statutes facilitate
citizen reporting of offences by offering confidentiality assurances if
requested by the whistleblower. In addition, retaliation in any form against
the whistleblower, in these regimes, is considered a sanctionable regulatory
offence.6 1 Compared to mandatory forms, however, legislation based on
toleration does not compel reporting, nor does it reward it. Also, in order
58. The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, 18 USC
(2002).

§

1514 (A)(a)

59. Ibid,s 301.
60. Most companies contract out compliance to "hotline" service providers.
61. In Ontario, this agreement has been incorporated into legislation in late 2002: Bill 198 amended
the Ontario Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S 5, Part XXIII.L. See, H Garfield Emerson & Geoff A
Clarke, "Bill 198 and Ontario's Securities Act: Giving Investors and the OSC Added Muscle" (Paper
presented at the 3rd Annual Directors' Governance Summit, 17-19 November 2003).
62. This informal convention among provinces is known by the name, Multilateral Instrument 52110.
63. Whistleblower-tolerant legislation may also prescribe in detail internal up-the-ladder procedures
for raising compliance concerns. See, e.g., CanadaLabour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2, s 127.1.
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for protection to attach, an employee must comply with the qualifying
criteria of the legislation, which may not be well known.
Section 16 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act' is
representative of this type of regulatory protection. The Criminal Code
supplements this as a form of criminal restraint. The Code criminalizes
supervisor and employer-organizational retaliation against whistleblowing
employees who report the violation of any federal or provincial legislation
to law enforcement authorities." This legislative reform was enacted in
2005 as part of the Canadian response6 6 to the SOX reform legislation to
strengthen oversight, governance, and accountability arising from largescale corporate failures at the turn of this century.6' Although its intent is
laudable, given its complexity 68 and its requirement of proof of full mens
rea, in our view it is unlikely that any convictions will result from it.6 9
Compensate
Under this category, whistleblowing is neither mandated nor merely
tolerated. Instead, whistleblowing that qualifies-either under
organizational policy or law-is rewarded, either financially or in
some other way. Providing tangible rewards recognizes the importance
of detecting and correcting wrongdoing, the palpable risks taken in
coming forward and the suffering that may accrue due to reprisals. The
compensatory approach, while rare, offers some examples in practice.
The most prominent whistleblower compensation framework is the
United States False Claims Act.70 The qui tam7 ' provision permits private
individuals to sue on behalf of the United States to recover government
losses due to fraud.72 If successful, the individual becomes entitled to a
portion of the proceeds.7 1 More recently, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall

64. Supra note 51.
65. Supra note 31, s 425.1.
66. The Canadian response is an almost exact duplication of the SOX reforms in the US: see Sukanya
Pillay, "Forcing Canada's Hand-The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Canadian Corporate
Governance Reform" (2003-2004) 30 Man LJ 285.
67. Supra note 58.
68. Section 425.1 of the Criminal Code must be seen conjunctively with s 140 (false accusation as
public mischief) and s 181 (spreading false news), supra note 51.
69. Peter Bowal, "Criminal Retaliation by Employers" (Paper delivered at the Annual Conference of
the Administrative Sciences Association of Canada, Banff, AB, 6 June 2006).
70. 31 USC §§ 3729-3733.
71. The full Latin phrase is qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur (who
pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his own).
72. See, Stephen M Kohn, supra, note 8 at 203 et seq.
73. Lamers v City of Green Bay, 998 F Supp 971, 977 (ED Wis 1998), aff'd 168 F.3d 1013 (1999).
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Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act74 allowed compensation to
whistleblowers in the financial sector. Subtitle B, headed "Increasing
Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies," equips the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) with expanded enforcement powers.75 These include
an imprudently-named "whistleblower bounty program," whereby
individuals who bring information leading to a successful SEC enforcement
may receive between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions over $1
million. Canadian companies listed on a US stock exchange are governed
by this law.16
There is no Canadian equivalent to the US False Claims Act. The
original draft of the Public Servants DisclosureProtectionAct" proposed
a cash reward for effective reports of federal public sector wrongdoing of
up to $10,000.78
The only whistleblower compensation program in Canada is operated
by Crimestoppers, 79a national civilian, non-profit, charitable organization
that works with community police services, the media, and local community
to combat crime. Cash rewards of up to $2000 are paid to anonymous
tipsters for information that leads to arrest of criminals, the recovery
of stolen property, or the seizure of illegal drugs. The organization's
cumulative statistics on closure of crimes Canada-wide are impressive. As
of March 2011, total cumulative value recovered from drug and property
crimes was about $3.4 billion.s0
Whistleblowers' motives are frequently questioned and impugned
in the ordinary course of mandatory and toleration whistleblowing. The
"bounty" debate about whether to appropriately compensate legitimate
disclosures to public authorities and the distortions this approach may
74. HR 4173, § 901. More specifically, the relevant provisions are in Title IX, ss 901-991, comprising
the Investor Protectionand Securities Reform Act of201 0.
75. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC s 78a et seq.
76. This bounty concept, unfamiliar to Canadian business, is generally criticized: see Drew
Hasselback, "Whistleblower Bounty Plan Widely Assailed," Financial Post (15 December 2010)
FPl2. The Dodd-Frank initiative, grounded in enhanced regulatory enforcement, is based upon
a similar Internal Revenue Service (IRS) program from 2006. In that program, the IRS rewards
whistleblowers who provide credible, original, specific information that any taxpayer has not paid
the due taxes. If the tip leads to the recovery of over $2 million in taxes and penalties, the tipster is
entitled to between 15% and 30% of that amount, without maximum. Reports of smaller tax frauds
are rewarded by up to 15% of the amount recovered-see InternalRevenue Code 26 USC s 7623.

77. SC 2005, c 46.
78. As a remedial measure, the original draft amendments would have authorized the Public
Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal to "compensate the complainant, by an amount of not more
than $10,000, for any pain and suffering that the complainant experienced as a result of the reprisal."
See, Bill C-2, 1st Sess, 39th Parl, 2006, s 27.1 (1)(f).
79. See, online: <http://www.canadiancrimestoppers.org>.
80. Statistics shown here are as of 28 February 2011, from the Crimestoppers website, ibid.
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create continues."' On one hand, the compensation may attempt to match,
if only symbolically, the risk and reprisal suffered by whistleblowers. If
legitimate reporting is to occur, a financial inducement, however modest,
may vindicate the whistleblower. On the other hand, the countervailing
concern is that the promise of whistleblower compensation sets up a clear
moral hazard. A policy to generate reports of wrongdoing, at least in part,
by financially enriching the whistleblower, creates a risk that reports
will be exaggerated or unfounded because the promise of compensation
overwhelms and governs one's motives. Where the consequences of
embellishment pale in comparison to the chance of reward, mischief is the
likely outcome. Despite the good intentions of a policy of compensating
legitimate whistleblowers, anything in the order of windfall compensation,
which is what may be required for full indemnity, is expected to generate
more specious reports that consume investigative resources and goodwill
than factually reliable reports.82
Regardless of the increasing prevalence of legislative initiatives,
protection for whistleblowers also exists at common law.
4. Common law: employee loyalty and organizationalsecurity
Whistleblowing must be balanced against the common law implied duties
of loyalty, fidelity, and good faith to organizations, such as duties owed to
employers with respect to their security83 and confidentiality interests. 84
Generally, even non-fiduciary employees are under a duty to refrain from

81. See, for example, Edward Waitzer, "Should We Pay for Whistle-Blowing?" FinancialPost (22
March 2011) FP 1l, and (responding) Dimitri Lascaris, "Speak Truth to Power," FinancialPost (25
March 2011) FP1.
82. There are many instances of this mischief described, which creates a new level of organizational
discipline. In a recent case in Calgary, Alberta, a long-time drug addict reported to police that four
men had killed one wild horse. The men were charged with criminal offences, lost their jobs, and
endured substantial debts to pay for defence counsel. Two years later, the charges were dropped when
evidence showed the horse died accidentally. It appears that the tipster was motivated to file a false
report by the $25,000 reward which had been offered by the Wild Horses Society. See Daryl Slade,
"Charges Dropped Against Three Men in Sundre Wild Horse Shooting Case," Calgary Herald (27
April 2011), online: <http://www.calgaryherald.com/Charges+dropped+against+three+Sundre+wild
+horse+shooting+case/4683572/story.html#ixzzl KsM9AThX>.
83. Thomson v Canada, [1992] 1 SCR 385, 89 DLR (4th) 218, 3 Admin LR (2d) 242, 51 FTR 267,
with respect to the public sector in relation to granting security clearances, at 396 (SCR), per Cory
J: "all governments must maintain some degree of security and confidentiality in order to function.
The most open democracy still requires a high degree of security and confidentiality with regard to
many matters.. .The degree of security required will vary with the position and role of the government
employee. The higher the position, the greater will be the access to sensitive information, and the
greater the need for security."
84. Stenhouse v Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 4 FCJ 437, (2004) 12 Admin LR (4th) 299,
(2004) 248 FTR 248.
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deliberately acting in a way that may harm the employer's business."
Competing against one's employer, taking secret profits, setting up
conflicts of interest, and divulging trade secrets or other confidential
information have historically been the essence of this legal duty.86 Most
or all of these latter activities are motivated, if not accompanied, by the
employee's personal enrichment.
The same cannot be said of conscience-driven whistleblowing activity.
Individuals choosing to disclose unlawful or harmful activity are unlikely
to be enriched by it. A person's conscience may motivate him to action,
which is not always seen by others to be in his best interests. This is what
makes the complexity of conscience-driven whistleblowing so fascinating.
Motives are relevant in the determination of which whistleblowers to
protect from retaliation, and most laws and policies call for good faith
disclosures.87 The motives of the whistleblower are usually grounded
in the public interest, law enforcement, and justice. It is not surprising,
therefore, that Canadian courts and labour arbitrators have been willing to
substantially narrow the common law application of the broadly-conceived
employee's duty of loyalty and fidelity to good faith internal disclosures
of actual or perceived wrongdoing. J.M. Weiler, more than a quarter of
a century ago, in his arbitral award in Re Ministry of Attorney-General,
Corrections Branch and British Columbia Government Employees'
Union" declared:

The duty of fidelity does not mean that the Daniel Ellsbergs and
Karen Silkwoods of the world must remain silent when they discover
wrongdoing occurring at their place of employment. Neither the
public nor the employer's longterm best interests are served if these
employees, from fear of losing their jobs, are so intimidated that they do
not bring information about wrongdoing at their place of employment
to the attention of those who can correct such wrongdoing. However,
the duty of fidelity does require the employee to exhaust internal
"whistleblowing" mechanisms before "going public". These internal

mechanisms are designed to ensure that the employer's reputation is
not damaged by unwarranted attacks based on inaccurate information.

85. See generally, Stacey Reginald Ball, CanadianEmployment Law (Aurora, ON: Canada Law
Book, looseleaf) ch 15.
86. Geoffrey England, Innis Christie & Merran Christie, Employment Law in Canada(Toronto:
Butterworths, looseleaf) at §11.113 to §11.118.
87. The definition of "protected disclosure" in legislation is often "a disclosure made in good
faith." See, PublicServants DisclosureProtectionAct, supra note 10, s 2(1) and the Public Interest
Disclosure(Whistleblower Protection)Act, supra note 11, s 2.
88. (1981), 3 LAC (3d) 140 at 163.
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Internal investigation provides a sound method of applying the expertise
and experience of many individuals to all problems that may only
concern one employee."
Reasonable and proportionate criticism of an employer's policies is
also not likely to be viewed as a breach of fidelity." This "whistleblower
exception" to the duty of loyalty was first acknowledged in 2001.91 In
2005, the Supreme Court of Canada in Merk v InternationalAssociation

of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Ironworkers, Local
771 strongly affirmed interpreting legislation to favour whistleblower
protection. 92 At issue in that case was whether Merk, who reported financial
irregularities to her union leadership-not a public body-had reported
to a "lawful authority" in accordance with the Saskatchewan Labour
StandardsAct whistleblower-protective provisions. 93 Binnie J. stated:
Linda Merk's letter to the General President of the International Union
of Iron Workers that "blew the whistle" on these alleged financial abuses
was a complaint "to a lawful authority" within the meaning of the Act and
brought Merk within the Act's protection. The plain meaning of "lawful
authority" includes those who exercise authority in both the private and
public context. If the legislature had wished to limit the scope of s. 74 to
complaints to a "public authority", it would have said so. The correctness
of the broader interpretation is reinforced by the purpose and context of
[the Act], as will be seen. Based on the trial judge's findings of fact, the
union's dismissal of Merk violated the Act.94
His Lordship continued:
Whistleblower laws create an exception to the usual duty of loyalty
owed by employees to their employer. When applied in government, of
course, the purpose is to avoid the waste of public funds or other abuse
of state-conferred privileges or authority. In relation to the private sector
(as here), the purpose still has a public interest focus because it aims to
prevent wrongdoing "that is or is likely to result in an offence". (It is the
"offence" requirement that gives the whistleblower law a public aspect
and filters out more general workplace complaints.) The underlying

89. Cited with approval by Binnie J in Merk v InternationalAssociation of Bridge, Structural,
Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local 771, [2005] 3 SCR 425, 260 DLR (4th) 385
[emphasis added by SCC].
90. Alberta Union ofProvincialEmployees vAlberta, supra note 26; Fraserv PSSRB, supranote 27.
91. - Haydon v Canada(TD.), [2001] 2 FC 82, [2000] FCJ 1368.
92. See Barbara B Johnston, Birch K Miller & Gary T Clarke, "On the Horizon: Increased Protection
for Whistleblowers" (Mar 2006) 15 Canadian Corporate Counsel 69-70; Peter Bowal, "Wrongdoing
at Work: Who 'Ya Gonna Call?" (2006) 30:4 LawNow 13; Sean C Doyle, "A Purposive Approach to
Whistleblower Protection" (2007) 44 Alta L Rev 903-910.
93. Supra note 11.
94. Supra note 89 at para 3.
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idea is to recruit employees to assist the state in the suppression of
unlawful conduct. This is done by providing employees with a measure
of immunity against employer retaliation. "[R]eports from insiders allow
for early detection and reduction of harm, reduce the necessity for and
expense of public oversight and investigation, and may ultimately deter
malfeasance.""
The Merk case arose a few months after Vaughan v Canada,9 6 in which
Justice Binnie, again for the majority, acknowledged the presence of an
exceptional category-referred to as "the Whistle-Blower Cases""which allows courts to employ their residual jurisdiction to hear
whistleblowing cases where the inherent impartiality or potential conflicts
may render the normal grievance process inappropriate. The court thus
circumvented the stringent Weber" line of authorities in labour relations. 99
Although technically the court relied on a statutory provision ("lawful
authority"), Binnie J.'s holding went far beyond what was necessary,
seemingly bending over backwards to find support for whistleblowers.
Thus, it seems more proper to cast this as a common law principle-which
again, we feel could be derived from conscience.
In the final analysis, the Supreme Court of Canada has, in its approach
to both statutory interpretation and the common law in the context of
whistleblowing, been supportive of an expansive approach to recognizing
legal protections for whistleblowers. We think, however, that a potentially
more effective approach could be to recognize whistleblowing as an
activity deserving of constitutional protection as a matter of freedom of
conscience. In order to do this, we first make the argument that freedom
of conscience deserves independent status, before showing how it would
apply in the context of whistleblowing.
II. Conscience: a constitutionallyprotectedfreedom
Section 2(a) of the Charter states that everyone has freedom of conscience
and religion. Undoubtedly, religion and conscience have much in common
both historically and theoretically, but in a legal, constitutional sense they
95. Supra note 89 at para 14; citing ES Callahan, TM Dworkin & D Lewis "Whistleblowing:
Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest" (2004) 44 Va J Int'l L 879
at 882.
96. 2005 SCC 11, [2005] 1 SCR 146.
97. Ibid at paras 18-24.
98. Weber v OntarioHydro, [1995] 2 SCR 929.
99. New Brunswick v O'Leary, [ 1995] 2 SCR 967; Brotherhood of Maintenanceof Way Employees
Canadian PacificSystem Federationv Canadian Pacific Ltd, [ 1996] 2 SCR 495; Regina PoliceAssn Inc
v Regina Board ofPolice Commissioners, [2000] 1 SCR 360; Allan v Alberta, [2003] 1 SCR 128, 2003
SCC 13; Goudie v Ottawa, 2003 SCC 14, [2003] 1 SCR 141; Bisaillon v Concordia University, 2006
SCC 19; Isidore Garon ltie v Tremblay, [2006] 1 SCR 27.
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should be treated separately. Freedom of conscience can function as a fully
realized, independent freedom, since its meaning is sufficiently distinct
from "religion."
The English word "conscience" comes from the Latin term conscientia,
which means knowledge within oneself or self-knowledge. It connotes a
joining ofknowledge ofthingsto self-knowledge. Conscientiafirstappeared
in the New Testament-in particular, through the writings of the apostle
Paul. In his Epistle to the Romans, for example, he noted: "wherefore [ye]
must needs be subject, not only for wrath but for conscience's sake."'o
Originally, conscience represented a joining of an individual's judgment
to God's knowledge of right and wrong, and a joining of self-knowledge to
God's knowledge of our thoughts and intentions.'0 ' Obeying one's rulers
and authority figures was thought good not just because of the fear of
civil punishment associated with disobedience, but was a way to do good,
through a conscience that accorded to God's. Its English origins are thus
tied strongly with Christian thought; in fact, there are no Sanskrit, Chinese,
or Japanese words for conscience.1 02
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first English use of
the word "conscience" occurred in 1225, where it was used in the moral
sense of a "consciousness of right and wrong," or as the "deity within
us." 0 3 Originally, it referred to the whole moral nature of humankind, but
it gradually became personified and individualized. Further refinements
followed: the OED gives Shakespeare's example from Hamlet, in which
Hamlet laments that "conscience does make Cowards of us all,"'0 which,
on one reading, suggests a doubting kind of conscience or the conscience
that keeps us from acting as our true selves (acts, by implication, that
would get us into trouble). Conscience is also used to describe an inward
knowledge or consciousness, such as an internal conviction. Although both
meanings derive from the self-knowledge of conscientia,the English word
implies a moral standard of action in the mind as well as a consciousness of
our actions. Conscience is thus the application of reason, employed about
questions of right and wrong, and accompanied by sentiments of approval
or condemnation. 0 A second, related meaning refers to a conscientious
100. New Testament, Romans 13:5 (King James translation).
101. See William Perkins, The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience, DistinguishedInto Three
Books (Amsterdam: Thetrvm Orbis Terrarvm, 1972).
102. See Edward G Andrew, Conscience and Its Critics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001)
ch 1.
103. The Oxford English Dictionary,online, sub verbo "conscience" [OED].
104. William Shakespeare, Hamlet in A Thompson & N Taylor, eds, The Arden Shakespeare: Third
Series (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2006) act III, scene 1,83.
105. See Webster s Revised UnabridgedDictionary, 1996, sub verbo "conscience".
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observance or practice; the sense of a practice of, or conformity to, what
is right. This meaning is commonly invoked in cases of conscientious
objectors. Shakespeare employs it in all these ways, sometimes meaning
moral judgment, other times religious scruples, and sometimes as inward
reflection.
"Conscience" is often invoked as a negative, in the sense of "having
something on one's conscience," or less euphemistically tied to wrongdoing,
as a "guilty conscience," having to "clear one's conscience," or acting in
a "fit of conscience" 0 6 from an existing guilty thought or deed (as Kant
says "Prudence reproaches, conscience accuses").' 07 It can also represent
an institutional or individual seal of trust or authority: "the conscience of
the court" or "binding on one's conscience," which can, at its limits, be
offended or astounded, as in situations that "shock the conscience."
As Wilhelm Mensching aptly describes it, conscience is the human
"inner ear" for the voice that tells us what we should do and what we
should leave undone, what the pattern and purpose of our lives should
be. But it is more than the existence of this voice-it is the particular
human ability to hear this voice within. Conscience thus acts as a warning
mechanism, telling us that certain work, thoughts, feelings, or acts are
wrong-headed or evil; at other times conscience acts as a calling or urging,
impelling action, words, thoughts, or feelings as being right and dutiful."
All adult humans have this conscience within. As Paul noted, in his letter
to the Romans, even "heathens" have a conscience: they have the moral
law "written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and
their thoughts the [mean] while accusing or else excusing one another." 0
The modern-day recognition of this fact is found in the first article of
the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, which reminds us that "all
human beings.. .are endowed with... conscience...."1o
The metaphor of a voice within (particularly the "voice of God")
is what brings conscience naturally inside the religious sphere."' For

106. Chatterjee v Ontario(Attorney General), [20091 1 SCR 624 at para 46.
107. Immanuel Kant, Lectures On Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 24.
108. Wilhelm Mensching, Conscience, translated by Ian Hagerty & Caroline Nicholson Jacob
(Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill Pamphlets, 1961) online: <http://www.quaker.org/pamphlets/phd/
php ll 7jr.html>.
109. New Testament, Romans 2:15 (King James translation).
110. UniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights, GA Res 217(111), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No 13, UN
Doc A/810 (1948) article 1 [UDHR].
111. Mahatma Gandhi spoke of conscience in this way; see Raghavan Iyer, The Moral and Political
Thought of Mahatma Gandhi (New York: Galaxy Books, 1978) at 122:. "I simply want to please my
own conscience, which is God."
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centuries, conscience had an almost material quality, interposed between
God and Man:
Man hath two witneffes of his thoughtes, God, and his owne confcience;
God is the firft and chiefeft; and Confcience is the fecund fubordinate
vnto God, bearing witness vnto God either with the man or againft him...
The naturall condition or propertie of euery mans confcience is this; that
in regard of authoritie and power, it is placed in the middle betweene
man and God, fo as it is vnder God and yet aboue man. And this naturall
condition hath two parts: the firft is the Subiection of consfcience to God
and his word'112
Socrates, Jesus, Luther, and Gandhi, for example, all referred to their
conscience as the voice of God.
One's conscience is also mutable. For years, Luther maintained
an attitude of respect and forbearance toward the Catholic churchhis conscience brooked no opposition to it. It was only as he aged and
developed his own thinking on religion that his attitude changed. Again,
as with religious belief, conscience is not necessarily, to all people at all
times, the infallible voice of truth, morality, or God. Our consciences
can ignore things unintentionally and unknowingly, or intentionally and
deliberately. Errors can be made where our own conscience confuses other
external voices with the inner voice of truth, reason, humanity, or morals,
etc. Since conscience cannot perceive all truths, understand all reason-or,
for religious believers, be equivalent to God-it is also prone to error. It
is constantly receiving other voices, such as those from parents, religious
institutions, the state, and the broader culture and society surrounding
us. These often substitute for conscience, taking over its autonomy and
usurping its role:
Hence very different decisions are made about what is true, right and
moral. It is the environment, and not the voice for which we each possess
a conscience, that determines the decisions of such consciences."'
Although these external voices may become internalized into one's
conscience (and they should, in some cases, in order to allow a conscience
to evolve) they can act both constructively and destructively on our
consciences. Since we adults all have a conscience, however, it is in our
view proper to say that those who commit acts of barbarism or are evil are
not devoid of conscience but are acting againstconscience.The mutability
of conscience is, however, one of its strengths. A conscience true to its
112. Perkins, supra note 101 at 44.
113. Mensching, supra note 108 at 15.
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humanity cannot remain satisfied with the status quo: "we have been
given a conscience so that we can hear a voice that wants more than strict
observance of the rules valid in our community-or in any other group." 14
A healthy conscience continually changes to reflect a better understanding
of the world around us.
Different religions and individual consciences manifest themselves
in a nearly limitless variety of forms, often diametrically opposed to one
another. The major religions, for example, have vastly different views
on what might be the ultimate purpose or divine understanding of the
universe. Even more mundane religious beliefs (or social customs that are
often associated with religious practices) can lead in different directions:
many Jews and Muslims do not eat pork while many Hindus do not eat
beef-each of them relate these practices to religious dogma. We can see
similar effects surrounding conscience-based beliefs: Martin Luther's
conscience compelled him to attack the Catholic church while Thomas
More's required him to defend it. Or, in a more modern vein, followers of
Martin Luther King Jr. and his non-violent resistance to segregation were
led by their consciences to believe that the laws were wrong and unjust;
those trying to uphold the laws must have felt it in their conscience that
the laws protected both whites and blacks alike. Conscientious objectors
feel compelled to object to military service while others may have a
conscientious belief that fighting and dying for one's country is the best
path. As Mensching says, two people can arrive at opposite conclusions
and yet both can be making a decision based on conscience."'
Conscience-based freedom could be used to protect a much broader
segment of beliefs and practices. For one, a broad reading of freedom of
conscience might protect those who are persecuted at the time for heresy,
but, in retrospect, are creating new religions. Martin Luther may have
received little or no protection for his beliefs under a traditional notion
of freedom of religion because, before his writings and the mounting of
his ninety-five theses, Protestantism, as a religion, did not exist. If his
freedom of conscience were protected, the result may have been different.
Similarly, Joseph Smith (and later Brigham Young) may not have had
to lead his adherents from New York to Utah to escape the long arm of
the state. It is also clear, however, that conscience-based guarantees can
go beyond any connection to religion. The ability to hear the voice of
truth, humanity, reason, or moral law is not dependent on membership in a
religious community nor on a belief in God.
114. Ibid at 16.
115. Ibid at 10-11.
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Although conscience normally pertains to individuals, it is important
to recognize that some connotations of "conscience" reflect a wider
constituency and call to action. Since our conscience can teach us what is
right and wrong with others and society, and ask us to "do good" to both,
it can reach beyond the individual, to a social conscience. The "Preamble"
to the UDHR alludes to this wider understanding of conscience: "Whereas
disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous
acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind....""' Sometimes

the awakening of a single conscience leads to the formation of a public
conscience against what had not been previously recognized as an injustice
or inhumanity. History is thus replete with examples where numbers of
humans have been led by conscience to recognize and fight injustice,
inhumanity, and evil. Witness Mahatma Gandhi's acts of civil disobedience
or Nelson Mandela's call to dismantle apartheid-the expansion of their
fight into the public conscience eventually galvanized support for change
(of course, theirs were not the only voices, but their public display of
conscience was an important factor in rousing public sentiment). Public
conscience reflects a healthy consideration for the future. A conscience
that does not want to know, for example, what will happen to the planet
as a result of climate change and the consequences it will have for future
generations, is unhealthy and limiting." 7
To some extent, it is the "public conscience" that is reflected primarily
in law": for example, the highest moral order as signified by the criminal
law is said to be the "legislated conscience of the state."'l 9 Thomas Hobbes
had the public view of conscience in mind in Leviathan where he recalled
that "conscience is a thousand witnesses" despite the effort of "men
vehemently in love with their own opinions [giving them the] reverenced
name of conscience." 2 0 In Hobbes' state of nature, where a person is
"subject to no civil law" there is every chance that one will "sin in all he
does against his conscience because he has no other rule to follow." 2 ' In
contrast, those who live in society have the "law [as] the public conscience
by which [they have] already undertaken to be guided."' 22 The great
diversity of private consciences, which according to Hobbes are simply
116. Supra note 110.
117. See supra note 108 at 23 Mensching uses the example of nuclear testing and nuclear war to
explore the importance of a collective conscience.
118. See Stanley Fish, "Think Again: Conscience vs Conscience," New York Times (12 April 2009),
online: NY Times <http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/conscience-vs-conscience/>.
119. R v Cyrenne (1981), 62 CCC (2d) 238 (Ont Dist Ct).
120. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merill, 1978) at 63.
121. Ibid at 254.
122. Ibid.
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"private opinions," means that without the public conscience of society
and the law there would be no need to obey the sovereign any more than
one felt it necessary to do so.1 23
In sum, as a word carrying distinct meanings, "conscience" has a
strong claim to be recognized as an independent freedom with separate
constitutional status from religion. It needs to be treated as more than just
a synonym or substitute for religion.
III. Freedom of consciencefor whistleblowers: an approach to s 2(a)124
A model for understanding and assessing freedom of conscience claims
for whistleblowers is based on two key points: (i) that the claim has some
connection to morality, and (ii) that the strongest claims evince some form
of compulsion. In addition, our model protects against abuse; in other
words, floodgate concerns are acknowledged and addressed.
1. Freedom of conscience may require some connection to morality
Liberalism takes the moral primacy of a person as one of its most
important aspects. Each person is separate, with his or her own interests
and aims, free and independent-the "unencumbered self."' 25 At the heart
of this individuality lies human conscience and its concomitant freedom.
Individual conscience lets us act in a manner that is true to self.
Yet, if it is to have some deeper meaning-and traction, especially for
purposes of legal constitutionality-freedom of conscience must be more
than simply any act of a conscious or sentient mind. The need to have
some moral component attached to an act is an obvious point of departure.
It would seem to be difficult to imagine freedom of conscience used to
backstop an argument that conscience required driving on the wrong side
of the road (unless it was to avoid something alive in the way), or using a
sledgehammer instead of a screwdriver to affix a hinge to a door. On the
other hand, it is more plausible to accept the views of someone claiming
to be a vegan because her conscience would not let her eat meat. We might
even grant the same person some ground to argue that her conscience will
not allow her to see other humans eat meat, although her demands upon
others at this point call for deeper analysis.

123. Ibid.
124. While it is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to refer to the growing body of
behavioural social science literature that attempts to identify the traits of whistleblowers and predict
their actions. It is this emphasis on understanding human behaviour that leads us to consider the
interplay between conscience and whistleblowing, both areas of the law which are just beginning to
receive theoretical and jurisprudential development in Canada.
125. Michael Sandel, ed, Liberalism and its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) at 4-5.
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In the same way that "religion" has been interpreted broadly for
purposes of constitutional law, a generous interpretation. of morality would
make sense in the context of conscience as it appears in s 2(a). Moral
convictions and commitments could be those that result from a conscious
effort to discern, hopefully after some consideration, what choices one
makes about what is right rather than wrong, just rather than unjust, good
rather than bad.12 6 For some, there is obviously a strong connection to
religion in the choices that will be made. In this broad sense, individual
subjective morality seems to belong within a conscience-based legal
claim; whether it is necessary or simply sufficient and how far morality
can affect others is less certain.
What makes the case of veganism potentially different from the choice
of which lane or tool to use, is, at least for the courts, the fact that some
reasonably important moral component is engaged (albeit, subjectively).
We see this in the limited jurisprudence on freedom of conscience: courts
have all interpreted "conscience" as belonging to a moral or ethical
dimension. In Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 127 R v Morgentaler,128 and
29
R v Big MDrug Mart,1
for example, the Supreme Court of Canada has
referred to conscience as consisting of deeply held beliefs and practices that
are akin to religious beliefs and practices. Chief Justice Dickson referred
to the possibility of conscience as a secular parallel to religion, the latter
simply a "prototypical" and "paradigmatic" system of belief and practice
that might well be subsumed under the larger body of a conscience-based
liberty.'10 Justice Wilson in Morgentalersimilarly articulated the freedom
as belonging to some form of personal morality that exists outside religion,
namely a "secular morality.""' This ties conscience to religion, but at the
same time recognizes its secular distinctiveness. It ensures conscience is
tethered to its foundation in conscientia, and is not simply any decision
made, or action taken, by a sentient being.
The difficulty with this articulation of the freedom is, as might be
expected, determining the exact parameters of "morality." In Morgentaler,
126. See Michael Perry, "From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom" (2010) 47 San Diego L Rev
993 at 996.
127. [2004] 2 SCR 551 [Amselem].
128. [1988] 1 SCR 30 [Morgentaler].
129. [1985] 1 SCR 295 [Big MDrugMart].
130. Ibid at para 123. Of course, this observation is itself problematic. There can, for example, be
deeply religious commitments about how to wash one's hands before a meal. The moral status of these
practices is said to come from God, without which they could begin to look like which side of the road
one should drive on. We attempt to deal with this by adding the qualifier "reasonably important" or
"deeply" to indicate moral beliefs of some profundity.
131. Wilson J in Morgentaler,supra note 128 at 179, quoting Professor Cyril Joad in Guide to the
Philosophyof Morals and Politics (London: Lund Humphries, 1947).
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Wilson J. seems to treat morality as a matter of human agency or
autonomy. It is the "woman's right to choose" she states, that must be
constitutionally protected.132 Are there to be any limits placed on this
choice? Or is the constitutionally protected choice to be grounded in
morality, as is presumably the case in deciding whether or not to terminate
a pregnancy, but then autonomy kicks in and allows individual choice
to govern? In other words, is Justice Wilson advocating for a threshold
decision based on morality in order to invoke freedom of conscience? This
has a superficial attraction to it, but can also lead to confusion: washing
hands before eating or prayer, for some religious adherents, is a matter of
morality because it stems from a command from God. On the other hand,
one can easily imagine decisions to terminate a pregnancy not based on
morality-because having a child would, for example "cramp my single
lifestyle," or would add to the "four children I already have and I don't
need any more." A person's right to choose can all too easily become any
decision made consciously; thus, the right to choose may not relate to
morality, nor does the significance or insignificance of an act necessarily
point us toward its morality.
The only case in Canada in which a court relied solely on freedom
of conscience to ground its decision is Maurice v Canada (AG).' In
that case, Campbell J. allowed Jack Maurice, a non-religious inmate at a
federal prison, to receive vegetarian meals on the basis that his freedom
of conscience was offended by a prison regulation permitting vegetarian
meals for religious reasons but no others. Unfortunately, it is unclear in
Campbell J.'s decision whether a moral element alone was sufficient to raise
a claim of constitutionally protected freedom of conscience. His reasoning
was ambiguous on this point: on one hand, it seemed as if some form of
moral repugnancy or aversion was important (vegetarianism was based
on the "immorality of eating meat"), but at the same time he noted that
"motivation for practising vegetarianism may vary."l34 This is an important
distinction. Vegetarians cite numerous reasons for avoiding eating animal
products (or, in the case of vegans, using them in any way): the love of
animals; the need to alleviate the willful suffering of a fellow sentient
being; the health benefits of avoiding meat; the increased efficiency of a
vegetarian diet; the negative environmental effects of raising livestock;
the more aesthetically pleasing look of vegetables compared to muscles,

132. Ibid at 147.
133. [2002] FCT 69 [Maurice].
134. Ibid at para 10.
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wings, and fat.' Would an independent freedom of conscience protect
a person who relied on any one of these reasons? Alternatively, does it
require someone to rely on only those reasons that can be considered
moral? (Which might exclude the aesthetic reason for being a vegetarian?)
Or does conscience require at a minimum, as Justice Campbell hinted, a
connection to moral disgust? And since he shied away from invoking s 15,
it is unlikely that he relied on another potential moral ground: equality or
fairness in treatment between inmates.
In sum, where conscience has been invoked as a legal freedom in
Canada, it has usually required some connection to morality, although the
content of that morality, and the extent of its connection, is unclear. The
importance of morality will, therefore, need to be considered in developing
a conscience-based framework for adjudication.
2. Compellable practice
A claim that a belief or practice is based on conscience should exhibit
qualities similar to those felt by adherents to religious doctrine: in many
instances the practice, if avoidable at all, is only done at great personal
cost to the claimant. Thus, it is not the "still, small voice of conscience"
that whispers to them, but a voice loud and insistent enough that compels
some to suffer grave personal trauma, or even face incarceration, rather
than fight against it.' 36 The prototypical examples are Thomas More and
Mahatma Gandhi, whose unbending consciences-their "moral squint"would not let them do the easy thing, or the common sense thing, but
instead cast their views against majority opinion of the day."'
Constitutionally protected conscience-based acts may also require
a certain deliberateness and intent. In our view, it would be difficult
to conceive of an act of conscience that is instinctual, reactive, or hotblooded. A person claiming that his conscience made him dive into the
water to rescue a drowning child would not be believed. Conscience-based
decisions, at least those that might engage legal protections, are more
likely to be those that require time to consider, such as the inner debate one
would have over whether to become a vegetarian, have an abortion, object

135. See, for example, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Ecco, 2002).
136. See Welsh v UnitedStates, 398 US 333 (1970).
137. See Robert Bolt's play, A Man For All Seasons where Cardinal Wolsey says to More: "You're a
constant regret to me, Thomas. If you could just see the facts flat on, without that horrible moral squint;
with just a little common sense, you could have been a statesman": (New York: Vintage International,
1990) act I, scene 2, 21.
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to war, or opt for euthanasia.'3 8 They seem to flow from an imperative,
similar to religious-based actions that receive legal protection. Stated
differently, these decisions stem from a sense of conviction about an act:
it is not what one wants to do, or why one wishes to do it, but the fact of
compulsion that makes conscience-based decisions worthy of comparison
to religious ones.
Much of the jurisprudence on freedom of conscience refers to the
importance of compulsion in assessing claims. In some cases the court
casts it in the language of duty: in R v Videoflicks,13 9 Tarnopolsky J. spoke
of the belief that "requires" a person to close his shop on a day other than a
Sunday; in MauriceJustice Campbell notes how Jack Maurice continued to
seek a vegetarian diet against strong opposition, recognizing his "sustained
efforts to maintain a vegetarian diet" as an important factor in the finding.
Although Campbell J. did not invoke the language of compulsion, it is
clear in his decision that he understood the deeply-felt nature of Maurice's
vegetarianism. Where compulsion is absent, courts have decided the
opposite. For example, in finding that Charles Roach could not rely
on freedom of conscience to obtain his citizenship without swearing
allegiance to the Queen, MacGuigan J.A. for the majority pointed out that
the CitizenshipAct does not impose an oath of allegiance on an applicant.'40
Similarly, where hunting advocates tried to rely on conscience as a basis to
continue fox hunting, the court was unsympathetic to their plight, partially
on the basis that nothing in the animal protection legislation "compelled"
them to act contrary to their consciences.' 4 ' None of the cases, however,
makes it clear whether this is either a necessary or sufficient component
of a constitutional conscience-based obligation. Nor is there consistency
on whether the feeling of compulsion is derived subjectively-from the
perspective of the individual claimant-or objectively.
Some courts question the necessity of compulsion. Although
Campbell J. in Maurice discussed the nature of Maurice's desire to
138. Compare with Kristen Monroe, The Hand of Compassion: Portraitsof Moral Choice During
the Holocaust (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Monroe uncovers, in her interviews with
people who rescued Jews from the Nazis, that many felt they had no choice, that their actions (which
in many cases threatened their own lives) were not the result of deliberation. Does this not nevertheless
involve the rescuer's conscience? We do not think our suggestion for some form of deliberation goes
against her position-it seems to us that a truly instinctive reaction (diving into water) is different from
"rescuing" someone from the Nazis, as the latter does not arise without warning or come completely
by surprise. The time for deliberation may not be long in such cases, but it is still sufficient to engage
one's conscience.
139. (1984), 48 OR (2d) 395.
140. Roach v Canada (MinisterofStatefor MulticulturalismandCulture), [ 1992] 2 FC 173 (Linden
J dissenting but not disagreeing on this point).
14 1. Whaley v Lord Advocate (2004), SC 78 (OHL).
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avoid eating animals, he seemed to be of two minds regarding a person's
conscience-based motivation. He stated that vegetarianism is a "dietary
choice." 4 2 In Morgentaler,Justice Wilson observed that a person's right
to choose is an inherent right flowing from the nature of conscience as
a fundamental freedom. Although some women may feel a compulsion
to obtain an abortion at all costs, it is more likely that women choose to
have an abortion amongst a range of alternative options. What brings the
decision within realm of conscience for her is that the option to choose an
abortion is an exceedingly difficult choice to make. And while Wilson J.
never discussed compulsion as an attribute of conscience-based decisionmaking, she acknowledged the intense personal conviction that would
almost certainly accompany a woman deciding whether or not to procure
an abortion. It is not a decision entertained lightly. It may involve family
members, friends, religious advisors, doctors, and other health officials.
While perhaps not compelled, it is such a long way from another person's
decision to, say, drive on the wrong side of the road or snort cocaine, that
it could be said to be different in kind. 14 3
Even if compulsion is necessary, there remains the problem of
subjectivity. In R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and
Skills,1" Lord Nicholls indirectly referred to the idea of conscience-based
compulsion by recognizing that some beliefs carry with them "perceived
obligations" to act in certain ways.145 But he set this up against other
beliefs that may lack an obligatory element, without stating directly that
legal freedom of conscience requires obligation nor whether it should be
subjectively or objectively measured. In Roach, the claimant's own feeling
that the oath was compelled seemed to carry little weight. Given the range
of views in all these cases, compellability will become a key factor in
developing a framework for conscience-based whistleblowing analysis
and will help address the possibility of bogus claims.
Indeed, some judgments have recognized the potential abuse of
conscience-based claims. In Videoflicks, Tarnopolsky J. sought to rein in
false claims by centering his analysis on the individual, but noting that
one's conscience cannot be offended by others' actions or freedoms. He
also sought to ensure that conscience-based freedoms are based on beliefs
which are binding on, or at least strongly felt by, someone. Likewise,
running throughout Justice Wilson's opinion in Morgentaleris the notion
142. Maurice,supra note 133 at paras 15, 9.
143. David Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at
75-77.
144. [2005] UKHL 15, 2 AC 246.
145. Ibid at para32.
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that it is a deep and difficult decision for any woman to choose whether to
have an abortion, which butts directly up against-as it did in 1988-the
state's attempt to compel a woman to carry a foetus to term. For her, it is
clear that a conscience-based decision must rest on a measure of profundity.
The decision is an "important" one, "intimately affecting" one's private
life,146 that will have "profound psychological, economic and social
consequences" and that engenders "powerful considerations militating in
opposite directions." 47 Put bluntly, for Justices Wilson and Tamopolsky,
conscience-based decisions need to be fundamental decisions that go to
the heart of what a person is, and what he or she believes in. While these
factors remain attractive, it is worth noting that this standard may be set a
little too high for whistleblowers, who usually turn to their sense ofjustice
or truth or honour before revealing all.
Many judicial decisions require a conscience-based belief to be
sincerely held, in the same way that the Supreme Court's test for religious
freedom, developed in Amselem, requires a sincere, subjective belief. The
need to have sincerity ground a conscience-based belief is equally strongin fact, arguably it is even more important than in religious freedom cases
as conscience-based beliefs, by definition, do not have the imprimatur of
a religion to back them up. As such, we see decisions based on conscience
which require a "deep and sincere belief,"l 48 a "genuine belief,"' 49 or
where petitioners are "sincerely convinced"'s of their belief One way of
locking the floodgates from spurious claims of conscience, is to test the
validity and legitimacy of a claim through the sincerity of the claimant. It
is an affront to the freedom itself if those claiming freedom of conscience
were doing so simply to escape performance of a legal obligation binding
upon others. Even someone who may not be making a spurious claim,
but who is doing so on the basis that it is a pragmatic option, should also
be controlled. Sincerity aids in ensuring, as described by Laurence Tribe
in the context of religion, that an overly broad approach to freedom of
conscience would not become a "limitless excuse for avoiding all unwanted
legal obligations."'

Moreover, sincerity is one aspect of a freedom of religion claim
that courts are comfortable assessing. As the Supreme Court stated in

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
859.

Morgentaler,supranote 128 at para 240.
Ibid at para 241.
Welsh, supra note 136 at 340.
Videoflicks, supra note 139 at para 45.
Whaley, supra note 141 at para 74.
Laurence Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw (New York: West Publishing Company, 1978) at
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Amselem, it is qualified to "inquire into the sincerity of a claimant's belief,
where sincerity is in fact at issue," despite being unable or unqualified to
rule on the validity of religious practices or beliefs.15 2 Courts are used to
assessing witness sincerity and constitutional claimants are no exception.
In a claim for freedom based on conscience, a court could examine, for
example, whether the practice or belief reflects a pattern of behaviour that
is consistent; whether there is some personal cost to the course of action
taken by a claimant; or whether the benefit received by avoiding a legal
obligation is met by other costs that most people would not voluntarily
incur. 153

Campbell J. in Maurice recognized this when he struck a suitably
cautionary note by requiring proof of "cogent evidence" for a conscientious
belief claim. 5 4 Cogent evidence means objective, external evidence. In the
Maurice case a few factors led the Federal Court to accept the legitimacy
of Maurice's conscience claim: his numerous requests and grievances,
the extensive time and effort spent on judicial review, and his sustained
efforts, against institutional obstruction, to maintain a vegetarian diet.
Maurice was decided before the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Amselem, which held that a "nexus to religion" coupled with a "sincerity
of belief' is sufficient to ground a claim of religious freedom. The actual
nature of the belief is left to the subjective determination of the individual
and may, in some cases, be unreasonable. Do the same concerns arise in
the case of conscience-based freedoms? Since, by definition, there is no
"nexus to religion" in conscience-based freedoms, the Amselem test might
just collapse into a simple requirement of sincerity in any consciencebased claim. In doing so, however, the potential for false claims increases.
In Williamson, Lord Nicholls referred to the Amselem test and adapted it
for a conscience-based freedom. By equating a conscience-based act with a
religious one-it must be of comparable importance to practices associated
with religious beliefs-he addresses the need to limit conscience's scope
in order to prevent floodgates from opening.
Of course, it must be recognized that compulsion, like morality,
is somewhat indeterminate. This presents an obstacle for some
whistleblowing situations. Easy are those cases we described as "mandatory
whistleblowing." Most corporate policies state that employees "have a
152. Amselem, supra note 127 at para 51.
153. It is worth noting the idea of "alternative burdens" suggested by Adam Kolber-see "Alternative
Burdens on Freedom of Conscience" (2010) 47 San Diego L Rev 919 at 928. Kolber suggests that
where alternatives are offered by government, for those such as conscientious objectors, they might
even be more onerous, as a way to help ensure sincerity.
154. Maurice, supra note 133 at para 15.
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duty to report." The "compensate" and "tolerate" are more difficult, as
reporting is not compelled by law or corporate policy. In these cases, the
internal voice compelling a whistleblower to "do the right thing" can be
strong. The compulsion is thus subjective, but it may be grounded in one
or more of a number of rationales: idealism, an abiding sense of truth or
honour, naivete, morality, personality, or trust. We feel, however, that the
varied protection offered by morality, compulsion, and sincerity should
alleviate most of the difficulties of using freedom of conscience to support
whistleblowers. That leaves us to consider the final question: "why
conscience" given the plethora of other constitutional protections offered
by the Charter?
3. Overlappingrights andfreedoms
One strong objection to creating a fully independent freedom of conscience
is that it is unnecessary, adding little to the broad scope of Charterrights
and freedoms already identified and developed. Thus, the argument goes,
religious and expressive freedoms (such as thought, belief, and expression)
under s 2, coupled with rights to liberty and equality under ss 7 and 15,
provide a full panoply of constitutionalized human rights protection. There
are two short answers to this. Firstly, all rights and freedoms deserve as
much protection as possible, in whatever form works. Secondly, and more
importantly, we turn the question around and ask why religious freedom
should be singled out at the expense of a broader freedom of conscience.
The advantages to broadening the freedom through the development of
conscience, where appropriate, seem to be plain. The words in the Charter
should all be treated with equal force.
The mere fact that the Charter provisions sometimes overlap is not
sufficient reason to ignore express words, such as "conscience," found
in the text. Freedom of religion and conscience will often overlap.
Conscience can overlap with thought, belief, and opinion. So can freedom
of conscience and liberty under s 7.15 Yet religion and liberty can also

very easily clash, although little has been made of this. In Blencoe v BC
(Human Rights Commission) the Supreme Court of Canada was asked
whether the Charter applied to an administrative tribunal and the scope
of "liberty" in the context of s 7 of the Charter.'6 The court gave a broad
reading to liberty:
The liberty interest protected by s. 7 of the Charter is no longer
restricted to mere freedom from physical restraint. Members of this
155. See Wilson J in Morgentaler,supranote 128, for evidence of this.
156. [2000] 2 SCR 307.
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Court have found that "liberty" is engaged where state compulsions or
prohibitions affect important and fundamental life choices... In our free
and democratic society, individuals are entitled to make decisions of
fundamental importance free from state interference.. .the liberty interest
protected by s. 7 must be interpreted broadly and in accordance with
the principles and values underlying the Charter as a whole and that it
protects an individual's personal autonomy... [T]he right to liberty in s.
7 protects the individual's right to make inherently private choices...'
The court then cited with approval a passage from Godbout v Longueuil
(City) that affirmed s 7's broad scope, containing within its ambit the "right
to an irreducible sphere of personal autonomy" over matters which by their
very nature "implicate basic choices going to the core of what it means to
enjoy individual dignity and independence.""' If freedom of conscience
contributes little to the right to liberty in s 7, then so does religion. One can
compare the passages from Blencoe and Godbout above as if they were
discussing religion. Religious belief is something that allows one to make
"inherently private choices" that go to the "core of what it means to enjoy
individual dignity and independence"; religion deals with "important and
fundamental life choices" that allow one to "live his or her life" in the way
he or she chooses. If s 7 is interpreted to include the exercise of religious
freedom, it would make s 2(a) entirely redundant.
There is a need to retain all the fundamental freedoms in s 2. They
differ from the legal rights set out in s 7 and elsewhere because freedoms, as
compared to rights, recognize a positive element that respects the autonomy
and individuality of all humans and permit them to flourish. Fundamental
freedoms are not subject to the internal limits of s 7's "in accordance with
fundamental justice." To argue that freedom of conscience is unnecessary
due to the protection of liberty in s 7 makes little sense unless one is
prepared to accept that freedom of religion is equally unnecessary.
Mindful of these constraints, the concluding step in the argument is to
elaborate a made-in-Canada approach to assessing freedom of conscience.
Conclusion
In Amselem, the Supreme Court of Canada spelled out a two-stage, threecomponent test for establishing a freedom of religion claim. An individual
must first show that
he or she has a practice or belief, having a nexus with religion, which
calls for a particular line of conduct, either by being objectively or
subjectively obligatory or customary, or by, in general, subjectively
157. Ibid at paras 49, 51.
158. Ibid at para 51, citing Godbout v Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 SCR 844 at para 66.
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engendering a personal connection with the divine or with the subject
or object of an individual's spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a
particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is
in conformity with the position of religious officials; and (2) he or she is
sincere in his or her belief.'
Then,
that the impugned contractual or legislative provision (or conduct)
interferes with his or her ability to act in accordance with his or her
religious beliefs in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial.Io

Our proposed approach for a broader freedom seeks only to modify this
test to fit within a framework more suited to conscience. The three parts
would require claimants to show, in the face of laws or conduct requiring
him or her to act contrary to conscience, that
(1) he or she has a belief of a moral nature (defined broadly as
described above), or a belief governing his or her perception
of themselves, humankind, or nature, which either calls for a
particular line of conduct that is subjectively obligatory or is a
demonstrably fundamental decision that goes to the heart of who
he or she is (in other words, is comparable with religious belief);
(2) he or she is sincere in his or her belief; and
(3) the impugned provision (or conduct), in purpose or effect,
interferes with his or her ability to act in accordance with his or
her belief in a manner that is not trivial or insubstantial.
Where a law imposes on such personal decisions in accordance with
the above, it should be found to breach the fundamental freedom of
conscience. This allows for an approach to freedom of conscience that
strives to separate legitimate from illegitimate claims: arguments made by
recreational fox hunters in Countryside Alliance,'6' for example, should
be distinguishable from those put forward by women seeking an abortion.
While both take a similar form-each arise from laws that impinge on
one's ability to act on a desire-as much as anything, hunting animals
for sport feels very different from aborting a child. In our view, hunting
is not something we should protect through freedom of conscience, while
abortion is. Recreational hunters are not, to our minds, engaged in an

159. Amselem, supranote 127 at para 56.
160. Ibid at para 59 (emphasis in original).
161. Countryside Alliance and others v HMAttorney General and others, [2005] EWHC 1677 (QBD
(Divisional Court).

124 The Dalhousie Law Journal
activity or behaviour that is of "comparable importance to religion."1 6 2
Hunting is an activity easily abstained from.163 Determining whether
to have an abortion, by contrast, is a quintessentially "moral decision."
Criminal prohibitions against abortion treat women as a "means to an
end," denying them of their "essential humanity."'" Hunting regulations
do no such thing.
Having developed the concept of freedom of conscience, the
application of it to whistleblowers is fairly straightforward. In simple
terms, legitimate whistleblowers should be thought of as performing
a service important enough to garner constitutional protection under
freedom of conscience. The whistleblower faces many of the same
obstacles and difficulties as do women who choose to abort, or those who
decline to eat meat for moral reasons. Whistleblowers feel compelled to
act, after difficult reflection upon the issue of the right course of action,
and weighing the consequences, they usually proceed in the face of
likely retaliation. As we noted earlier, it is the aspect of doing "good"
or "justice"-in the face of a strong potential for retaliation, in any form
and degree-which most connects whistleblowing with conscience. At the
same time, freedom of conscience provides an effective analytical tool
with which to assess genuine whistleblowing: a person who proceeds to
blow the whistle without engaging in a conscience-based assessment prior
to doing so, should not be protected. The parallels with, on the one hand,
hunting and, on the other, abortion and vegetarianism are strong-a person
who blows the whistle motivated by malice is little different from a person
wishing to hunt fox: neither should be able to claim that their behaviour
fits our model of freedom of conscience. In contrast, a whistleblower
who claims an inner compulsion to "do the right thing" by publicizing a
superior's wrongdoing, is acting much like a woman who agonizes about
the need to abort a child or the vegetarian who cannot eat meat. In those
cases, the decision requires the same moral squint that allowed Gandhi to
take on an entire nation. By tying whistleblowing to conscience, through
adopting legislative and policy choices that engage this universal aspect
of humanity, some of the concerns inherent in whistleblowing will be
reduced.
A robust understanding of conscience could change the nature of
the constitutional freedom envisioned under s 2(a) of the Charter. By
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elevating conscience as the paramount morally-based, individual freedom
and reserving religious freedom for its more natural fit with communal
practices, a uniquely Canadian approach to the problem of belief-based
claims could be crafted. Since a central commitment of our Charter, as
the Supreme Court of Canada noted, seeks to protect the dignity and
vulnerability of all persons and to treat all individuals as equals, a strong
form of freedom of conscience would allow us to be fair in all matters of
ultimate destiny, by protecting religious adherents and morally-bound nonreligious individuals alike. To rely on one's legally-protected conscience
is to assert one's fundamental integrity and dignity on a matter that is
unconditionally serious, non-negotiable, and binding. It is, in essence,
religion writ small.
Freedom to blow the whistle and to be effectively free from retaliation
supported by the force of law, fit seamlessly within this enhanced idea
of conscience. We believe that whistleblowing, like other morally-based
activities, may well be viewed in terms of a constitutionally protected right
with the requisite government apparatus accorded other Charter rights.
Honest whistleblowers deserve no less.

